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Leon Trotsky stood as one of the most prominent Bolshevik members in Russia
from the onset of the revolution in 1917 until his expulsion from the Communist Party
and exile in 1927. He earned respect for his Marxist philosophy, organizational abilities,
and brilliance as a public speaker. After the Revolution of 1917 and immediately
following the Russian Civil War, Trotsky stood second only to Lenin within the
Bolshevik Party in the eyes of the public. Trotsky, though joining the Bolshevik Party
only on the eve of the revolution, had proved his abilities in inspiring the masses and also
in creating the Red Army from the remnants of Russian Army, which was decimated by
the effects of World War I and the revolution. His prominence at this time has led many
historians to study and evaluate his career, and its rapid decline. Historians have been
intrigued by how a man so brilliant, so popular in the eyes of the public, could have failed
to take the reins of the Soviet government after Lenin's illness and eventual death left the
Communists searching for new leadership. Stalin's rise to power and the tension created
in the world by the Soviet emergence as a world power under Stalin's authoritarian
control have only heightened interest in Trotsky's demise.
Two schools of thought have dominated most thinking regarding Trotsky and his
career. One asserts that Stalin was the natural and inevitable successor to Lenin. This
view was common during the Cold War, as many historians tried to argue against the
whole notion of Communism by asserting that a leader like Stalin is the only kind of
leader that sort of system will produce. The idea is that the Soviet state lends itself to
dictatorial control and, even if Stalin had not been the individual to take power, a Stalinlike regime would still have been the result, regardless of who was at the top. This kind
of thinking was dangerous because it discouraged the researching the alternatives to
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Stalin. It created an environment whereby people would not study this period because
there seemed to be no point. Stalin was destined to be the leader; there were no
alternatives. Dmitri Volkogonov' s work, Trotsky: The Eternal Revolutionary, shows
some of this type of thinking. Volkogonov argues that Trotsky suffered from the
authoritarian controls that he himself had instituted during the civil war. In this way,
Volkogonov implies the same kind of inevitability, the kind of measures the Soviet state
had to take to survive lent itself to control by a dictator. What makes this so interesting is
that it did not come from a western historian, but rather from a Russian. Stephen Cohen
challenged these ideas in his biography of Nikolai Bukharin. Cohen rejected the notion of
historical inevitability, and he tried to prove that there were alternatives to Stalin, that one
of them was Bukharin.
Cohen's book inspired my study. Trotsky may be seen as another alternative to
Stalin, just as Bukharin was. I am not the first to see Trotsky as a viable alternative. But
too often historians researching Trotsky have romanticized his life to the point that it
defies reality. It is an easy trap to fall into as Trotsky from afar seemed so perfect, almost
a foil to Stalin: a brilliant man, imaginative and bold, a speaker with enough fire to tum a
crowd into a revolutionary force. Stalin did not seem to have any of these characteristics,
and many people wonder how he could have prevailed. They also wonder what life
would have been like had Trotsky, and not Stalin, taken control of the Soviet Union.
How different would the world be? Trotsky has come to be one of Stalin's most famous
victims, and for many historians his undying devotion to the Party has turned his life into
one of a martyr. Isaac Deutscher's three-volume work on Trotsky, though obviously the
most impressive work on the subject, in some ways falls into this trap. It is clear from the
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title, identifying Trotsky as a prophet, that some sort of romanticism exists. Deutscher's
work goes a long way toward answering some of the questions about Trotsky's life, and it
is no doubt a starting point for this paper as well. But it is apparent that in some ways
Deutscher falls victim the romantic notion of Trotsky as a person.
I have tried to avoid these ways of thinking, and get a clearer picture of Trotsky's
fall from prominence. My work instead focuses on the period of the beginning of the
New Economic Policy (NEP), in which many of the decisions being made affected the
future of the Soviet Union. This is the environment in which the struggle for power took
place, for it is at this time that Lenin's role in the Party began to diminish, and many
Party leaders began to make moves to take control. This paper culminates with the
historic Twelfth Party Congress of 1924, which for all intents and purposes ended
Trotsky's significance in the Party.
In order to fully understand Trotsky's position in the Communist Party in 1922, it
is important to take a brief look at his earlier political and revolutionary history in Russia.
Trotsky's first work of significance came in 1902, as a member of the editorial board of
the newspaper Iskra. It is here that Trotsky first met Lenin and began to work with major
Bolshevik and Menshevik leaders. At this time, most of the major Communist leaders
still worked together, and Trotsky began to distinguish himself within these circles as an
able thinker, writer, and political theorist. The collaboration among these different
Communist circles did not last long, as Lenin began to think more and more that
professional revolutionaries needed to lead a Marxist revolution, rejecting the popular
belief that revolution should come thro~gh the working class as a natural social and
political movement.
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Trotsky was one who denounced Lenin's more radical tone, and his
disagreements with Lenin, which later became so significant and magnified, began at this
point. Trotsky's book Our Politcal Tasks, written in 1904, in large part as a reaction
against Lenin's notions of a reorganization of the Party, argued that the Party should not
lead the revolution, but rather the social classes should lead. Trotsky was fearful of a
movement that was not led by the masses, but rather by a small group of political
vanguards. He wrote a prophetic statement that it seems he would unfortunately forget,
"the party organization will substitute itself for the party, the central committee will
substitute itself for the organization, and finally, a dictator will substitute himself for the
central committee." 1 Trotsky also disagreed with Lenin over whether workers should be
allowed to join the party, as Lenin maintained that only professional revolutionaries
should comprise the political vanguard of the party. Trotsky's book was further
characterized by personal epithets hurled at his former and would be political mentor.
Some have argued that this was an example of Trotsky's youth, his romantic, impulsive
temperament rebelling against authority.2 But perhaps more importantly, this
disagreement with Lenin shows much about Trotsky's strengths as an intellectual but
weaknesses as a politician. His unyielding pride, self-assured individualism and
independent judgement shone through in his disagreement with Lenin. 3 Trotsky's stance
against Lenin left him isolated in the political world. He was a revolutionary with no
cause, and he had attacked the Bolsheviks but ultimately did not agree with the
conservatism of the Mensheviks. He tried to seek a balance between the two factions but
his attempts at reconciliation were completely unsuccessful. Lenin was already
1
2

Leon Trotsky, Trotsky's Notebooks, 1933-1935 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 31-32.
Robert Wistrich, Fate ofa Revolutionary (New York: Stein and Day, 1979) 29.
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displaying the unyielding will that succeeded in the times of crisis and revolution. He
made up his mind about how he wanted the revolution to be run and was not willing to
change his stance for anyone.
~

Trotsky's isolation rendered him largely inactive for the next decade. Slowly but

steadily he and Lenin came to be on the same side on many issues, and as time passed the
insults of the past seemed to fade away. Trotsky had changed many of his opinions
regarding the work of the Communists, and he now favored revolution in the same way
that Lenin did: with the leadership of a political vanguard made up of political
revolutionaries and not the working class. They would not wait for the social forces to
align themselves the proper way, for capitalism to develop in Russia, for the necessary
period of development, and ultimately for the proletariat to throw off the chains of
oppression and begin a new order in society. Trotsky agreed with Lenin's notion to seize
dpportunity where it presented itself. Trotsky finally reconciled fully with Lenin in May
1917, and he and his intellectual followers were allowed into the Bolshevik Party at the
behest of Lenin. Despite the predominantly peasant nature of Russia, Lenin and the
Bolsheviks saw the opportunity for revolution in 1917. , World War I had left the country
poor and bitter towards the Tsarist government. Bolshevik promises of "peace, bread,
and land" were enough to attract the support of the masses. Lenin was further convinced
that revolution would follow in the West, providing Russia with the necessary industry to
survive as it set the example for communism throughout the world.
It is undeniable that the years ofrevolution and civil war were Trotsky's high

point, standing alongside Lenin. 4 His rise in the Bolshevik Party, which for so long he

3
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stood outside of, vilified as a Menshevik, was remarkable. He entered the party directly
into its upper echelon, and displayed an ability as an orator and political agitator that
gained him notoriety and popularity with the masses. His rise was not so well received
by many others within the Bolshevik Party, the so called Old Guard, who had been by
Lenin's side since the beginning, and knew well his dispute with Trotsky. These men
grew jealous of Trotsky and his abilities, and Trotsky's own personality further hindered
the relationship between him and the Old Guard. To the end of Trotsky's life he
displayed an arrogance that lent nothing to personal relationships. It is evident even in
his diary kept while in exile, which shows a disdain for many works written at the time.
Unlike Lenin, Trotsky did not mince words ifhe felt that someone was missing the point.
He was quick to point out flaws in someone's argument, and cared not for how this
would affect his relationship with that person. Lenin himself wrote in his famous
Testament, that while Trotsky "is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present
[Central Committee] ... he has displayed excessive self-assurance." 5 This simple passage
goes a long way toward showing how popular Trotsky may have been in the upper
reaches of the Party. Even Lenin, probably his biggest supporter, was put off by parts of
Trotsky's personality. His personality in no way endeared him to the band of career
Bolsheviks who were known as the Old Guard. "The Old Guard was a formidable body
6

of men. They were bound together by memory of heroic struggles. " These men had ties
to the Party long before Trotsky was even a member; now this "semi-Menshevik" was
becoming so powerful he would not even recognize them. Everything about Trotsky,

5
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including his fertile mind and oratorical boldness, gave the Old Guard a feeling of
inferiority. 7 His lack of friends in the upper reaches of the Party became that much more
significant during the struggle to succeed Lenin, which was in fact a struggle for the most
part limited to the upper reaches of the Party, and did not really involve rank and file
members.
Stalin's rise in the Party was in direct contrast to Trotsky's. Stalin was a
Bolshevik from the beginning, but he did not impress anyone with his amazing abilities
or fertile mind, and much of his early political and revolutionary career was characterized
by anonymity. For much of his early political career Stalin was a relative unknown.
Stalin had been a committeeman and organizer, and did not distinguish himself in any
theoretical discussion, preferring to stay in the middle on most arguments. Stalin was in
every way a member of the Old Guard, and in every way that Trotsky was offensive to
the Old Guard, Stalin stood in sharp contrast to him. His rise to power was not as
obvious as Trotsky's, and had not come so suddenly and on the heels of the revolution.
He had proved himself to be a solid organizer for Lenin, and his rise through the Party,
though not as rapid or impressive as Trotsky's, was significant nonetheless. By the civil
war both men held important posts in the Party, and it was during the civil war that
Trotsky and Stalin first clashed with each other.
Trotsky played perhaps the most significant role in the Bolshevik Party during the
civil war. The reason for this is that he for the most part constructed the Red Army on his
own as Commissar of War. He headed the Revolutionary Military Committee, and riding
a train to all the fronts directed the operations in the field of the Soviet army. Stalin
6

Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed--Trotsky: 1921-1929 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959)
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frequently ignored the orders given by Trotsky, and on more than one occasion failed to
meet the objectives set out for a certain area. Stalin continually tried to go over Trotsky's
head, and for that reason Lenin many times had to serve as mediator between them. 8 It is
apparent from the time of the civil war that these two men could not work well together.
The seeds of disagreement were planted here, and it is no wonder that Lenin predicted in
his Testament that a struggle between these two men could lead to a split in the Central
Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky's arrogance inspired jealousy and distrust
from the Old Guard, and Stalin would emerge as its leader. When a struggle for power
would take place, Trotsky would find himself for the most part alone in the upper reaches
of the Party.
The civil war was significant not only because of the tensions it generated
between Stalin and Trotsky, but also the harsh tone that was introduced by Trotsky.
,

Trotsky showed a willingness to do just about anything in the name of the revolution; he
was willing to stand by the notion of the end justifying the means. Trotsky did what was
necessary to reorganize the military, an organization that was nearly ruined but needed to
battle the counter-revolutionary White Armies. Trotsky had to adopt harsh policies, and
repression became a key part of the military structure. Part of the reason for this was the
need for Tsarist officers as military specialists, and Party members seriously doubted the
loyalty of their former oppressors. Trotsky demanded order and discipline from the
specialists and from Party factions, and promised to handle either one "with complete
9

mercilessness" should they become a problem. The danger with the policies of strict
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discipline and harsh realities occurred when they spread to the public at large. The policy
of war communism, with its industry directed toward the production of war materials and
the policy of grain requisitioning, created an environment in which the peasants resented
the government and the working class was decimated by service time in the anny. The
strict discipline that Trotsky demanded from his soldiers was now demanded of the
peasants in the fonn of supplying the government with what it needed. Certainly this was
not what many Bolshevik leaders had in mind at the inception of their revolution.
The civil war changed many party leaders' attitudes and goals, all in the interest
of preserving the revolution. But how far would all this change go before the original
goals they were trying to protect were subverted? Trotsky had used any means during the
civil war to rebuild the anny and defcat the White Annics. He did not have many
opponents of his military policy, but he made no effort to court friends either. When he
faced opponents within the Party leadership, Trotsky would appeal directly to Lenin
rather than smooth over rclationships. 10 Many of the changes that occurred during this
time were at Trotsky's behest, and Trotsky's popularity was never higher than during the
revolution and civil war. Trotsky embraced Bolshevik Jacobinism: ruthless centralism
and iron discipline. His self-confidence led him to excesses that, while protected by
Lenin's hand, did not seem that extrcme. 11 In his work Terrorism and Communism,
Trotsky advocates the militarization of labor, and also the use of violence in the interest
of revolution. 12 Trotsky did what was necessary to survive, but in this we find the seeds
of a political machine founded on discipline and guaranteeing a revolutionary
dictatorship. Trotsky's decline begins immediately following the civil war and the
10
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Ibid., 186.
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policies he helped create. It would not be long before he was fighting against the
centralism and unyielding discipline tinged with notions of violence and intimidation that
he once supported. Within less than a decade following the civil war, Trotsky was
dropped into the "memory hole" as Stalin rewrote history to his own liking. 13 The
struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, begun during the civil war, was only heightened by
the end of the war and the advent of the New Economic Policy (NEP).
The period following the civil war called for a change in policy from the
hardships of war communism and "terrorism and communism." The revolution of 1917
had itself seemed so easy, but it was quickly followed by years of civil war. The
promises that the Party made of "peace, bread, and land," were put on hold until the
opponents of Bolshevism were defeated. Now that the civil war had ended, the Party had
to face two harsh realities. The first was that the country was decimated by years of war
and mismanagement, and the renewal of industry and agriculture was essential to the
survival of the country. Those in the working class who had escaped death and starvation
at the front had left the cities, and in 1921 Moscow and Petrograd had respectively only
one-half and one-third of their former inhabitants. Russia's national income was less
than one-third and industrial output less than one-fifth of their pre-war levels.

14
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peasant class was alienated and withholding grain from the government for its own
benefit. The second problem and the more shocking one to the Bolsheviks was an
absence of proletarian revolution elsewhere in Europe. Lenin believed, unlike the
Mensheviks and most other Marxists in Russia, that a socialist revolution could occur in
12

Daniels, 121-123.
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predominantly peasant Russia without a well developed industry so long as a political
vanguard in the form of the Bolshevik Party directed this revolution. He did not believe
they needed to wait for social forces to align themselves properly, but he did believe that
a key component of the success of the revolution had to come from further revolutions in
the more industrialized West. Lenin and Trotsky both believed that Russia would need
the help of an industrialized country to sustain its economy, and neither man gave much
thought to what would happen if no revolutions followed. Each man firmly believed that
revolution in the West was a foregone conclusion, especially considering the hardships of
World War I. Much of the early policy of the Bolsheviks was done as a type of holding
pattern, to maintain the country only so long until the necessary help from the West
would arrive. This attitude is apparent in the Treaty of Brcst-Litovsk with Germany,
negotiated by Trotsky in March 1918. The Bolsheviks had no desire to remain in a war
they identified as a war between imperialist nations, but they first used the treaty
negotiations as a platform for propaganda. They remained confident that any treaty
would be rendered useless anyway if the German Revolution were to come. Lenin
sought immediate peace whatever the cost, and hoped for a German revolt. "It is the
absolute truth that without a German revolution we arc doomed."

15

This separate peace

that was ultimately signed was harsh towards the Russians. Germany was allowed to
remain in all lands already occupied while Russia was forced to surrender all occupied
lands. Russia was also forced to pay an indemnity of three billion rubles, payable over

u Lenin's Report on War and Peace given to Seventh Party Congress, 7 March 1918, in Robert V. Daniels,
ed., A Documentarv Historv of Communism and the World (Hanover NH: University Press of New
England, 1994) 18.
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seven years. 16 This treaty was agreed to by the Russians despite its strict conditions
because Lenin and the Bolsheviks held the belief that proletarian revolution would
succeed in Germany and void that treaty. The notion of survival at any cost is also
apparent in the harsh policies of war communism. Amidst these circumstances, the
Bolshevik Party began in 1921 a new course in the form of the NEP. But coupled with
the relaxation of policies toward the masses, the Bolshevik Party decided the only way
through these problems was through discipline and unity within itself, so that the political
vanguard could provide a unified front without the problems of dissension.
Trotsky was very much in line with these views, and at the I 0 111 Party Congress in
March 1921, he said that the Party had an historical birthright to rule, and it was obliged
to maintain its dictatorship over the working class and therefore the country. 17 In as
much as the 1Olh Congress was characterized by a relaxation of discipline for the country
at large, it was also characterized by a tightening of discipline within the Party. In
response to the "Workers' Opposition" and the "Democratic Centralism" group, the
congress passed a resolution proposed by Lenin and supported by Trotsky to "realize the
... impermissibility of factionalism of any kind."

18

Trotsky could never fully resolve

this conflict in his own mind, for he fully supported the notion of party unity, but also
supported ideas of intellectual freedom. With the I olh Congress and this resolution, many
of Trotsky's followers lost key positions to supporters of Stalin, who were more suited to
maintaining party unity and making sure that others did as well. The Bolshevik Party
was facing an uncertain future, but through all its policy shifts, one thing remained
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constant even then: Stalin and Trotsky were on opposite ends of e\'ery issue. ·nu:
disagreements between these men sprnng from an instincti\'e antagonism of
temperaments, backgrounds. political inclinations. and personal mnbitions. 19 Lenin had
kept their disagreements in the background for much of the ci\'il war. hut it would be
thrnst into the fore with the advent of the NEP.
l11e strngglc for power in the So\'iet Union was brought into the open with
arguments involving the future of Russia and the policies of the NEP. Lenin did not hold
the disagreements between Stalin and Trotsky in check any longer. Lenin took an ncti\'e
role in the arguments that invol\'ed the future of Russia, and he much more than Trotsky
understood how strong his opponent really was. The NEP w;t'i nn important policy
because it introduced capitalist idea.-; into the economy with the idea of building socialism
in Russia. l11e NEP wa.o; a controversial plan and there were many policy issues that
caused great debate within the highest reaches of the Party. in the Central Committee and
in the Politburo. The most important of these issues. around which the struggle for power
was magnified. were the monopoly of foreign trade, the Georgia and nationalities
question. and finally the issue of state planned economy. Trotsky did his best to play an
active role in all these debates, but the e\'eryday routine of the bureaucracy was Jost on
Trotsky.

~fany

of Trotsky's talents. such as holdncss and oratorical genius which served

him so well in the revolution and the civil \\;ir. were ill-suited for the bureaucratic routine
and organization that characterized the Party in Lenin· s la~t years.:' In this environment
1

Stalin. the organizer and

"Deutscher. 5-1.

administr~1tor.

excdk<l and advanced. l le not only worked the

~Robert D. Warth. Lc<'n Trn:~~ CB0s:cm T·...1-.::~ l';;!'l11!:(:r;, J'li7J I H
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bureaucratic apparatus of the country to his advantage. hut he had none of the personal
attributes that alienated Trotsky from the rest of the Politburo.
It is important to note at this point that, while in theory the Ccnlral Committee

(CC) was the policy making body of Russia. in reality the Politburo, comprised of 11 few
members of the CC, was the real policy making body of the Russia. Lenin exercised
considerable influence in the Politburo, and for this rc;Lo;on he was essentially the sole
niter of Russia, though in theory the government wa-; supposed to be controlled by the
Party as a whole. What this meant is that whoever controlled the Politburo controlled the
country. and this is why the Politburo was constantly changing into different alliances
and factions. As long as Lenin was alive. all these groups dared not challenge his
authority, but it would not be long before Stalin recognized the necessity of allies within
the Politburo. Trotsky found it unseemly to engage in a struggle for personal power, and
he was generally inept as a politician. 21 Trotsky's prominence and reputation were bac;ed
in the successes of the rc\'olution and the civil war, and in the public's eye he still held
great esteem. But these political battles were to be fought in the upper reaches of the
Party. Trotsky's position was again strong with the support of Lenin, but without Lenin
Trotsky was simply a man without allies in the Politburo. His position within the Party in
the 1920s was perhaps not ac; strong as many people hdicve.
Lenin and Trotsky had not begun on the SJme side of many of these issues. hut
arrived there slowly. Lenin began to qucqion the problem of excessi\'e bureaucracy. hut
he bclic\'ed that it existed only in the gm cmmcnt. with all its non-Party officials and
people with a lack of understanding for \brxiq doctrine. Trotsky was arguing that the
dan~ers
~

of burcaucrac\'. had bled into the nr.'.ani1~1tional
structure of the Partv. ac; well as
..."

I~

the govemment.

22

But it is clear that Lenin was not satisfied with conditions in the

country and had clear reservations about the success of the NEP m1d the Party in huilding
socialism. In his political report to the I l 1h Congress in the spring of 1922, Lenin
expressed doubts that the NEP it was operating the way they wanted after one year. I le
said quite bluntly, "the machine refused to ohey the hand that guided it.'' 21 Lenin
continued by saying that the Communists were not directing. hut were in fact being
directed, by the machine. I le was already fearful of the machine that was growing. in
Russia, and that if not run properly would continue to nm the Party. I.en in said that the
right people were not performing the right tasks. in that men who were great
revolutionaries were directing industry, of which they know nothing. ·111ese statements
were not exactly the same as those of Trotsky. hut in essence hoth men were beginning to
argue the same poinLc;. TroLc;ky was ;uguing for proper economic planning, but also for
education and the training of people to become specialists who would know the right
things to do. Lenin argued the same basic point, the need for specialists to do what they
know best. From these beginnings. Lenin and Trotsky would come together completely
on the issue of the monopoly of foreign tr;1de.
The basic issue of the state monopoly centered on a resolution p<L<>scd by the CC
on 6 October 1922 in Lenin's and Trobky"s ahsence. \\hich we;1kencd the st;1te
monopoly of foreign trade. What this mono roly meant was that the st;1te served as
middleman between internal and external markets. ·1he Ru""i;m government could huy
flax from peasants at 4.5 rubles per unit. ;111,l ·di it to Britain at 14 rnhlcs per unit. ·mis
meant that the state would make a profit an:- time the<;e tran,;1ctions occurred. By the
--·-

:i Ibid., 113.
:: Lenin and Trotsl~, 1·1-15.

---------------·----·--

16

srune token, Soviet factories produced tractors fiJr I 000 rubles. while the same tractors
were produced in America for 500 mhlcs. Since the state controlled the market. it could

buy tractors from America for 500 rubles. then sell them to peasants for I 000 mhles.
This not only turned a large profit for the go\'emment hut it also protecll·d Soviet industry

by pre\'enting America from underselling Soviet tractors. All this w:L'i contmry to the
interests of the peasants. so it created a large en\'ironment for smuggling. ·n1e resolution
thnt passed weakened some of the restrictions placed on peasants, and ga\'e them the
freedom to legally sell goods on the world market and keep profits for themselves.~~
Trotsky and Lenin both saw danger in this resolution. and the conflict began when
Lenin sent a letter to Stalin on 13 October 1922 criticizing the decision. Lenin \\Tote that
the decision was made too hastily. without enough discussion. I le felt it was one thing to
deal with indi\'idual smugglers, but this resolution would mean that many peasants would

be smuggling. Lenin felt that the monopoly of tr;1de wa.'i just beginning to pay off, and
that this resolution only introduced chaos into the situation. I le thought that just because
the apparatus was imperfect one should not throw away the monopoly. Lenin asked
Stalin to wait until he and Trol<iky were allowed to speak on the issue themsclves.

25

Lenin would wait until December to a.'ik Trot.sky for his support. but he found Trotsky
was fully supporti\'e of his views. Trot.sky wrote. "maintaining and .Hren~tltenin~ the
monopoly of foreign trade appears absolutely impcrati\e:·='· Trotc;ky at this time
displayed more political knowledge thJn he \•,nulJ in later ..irnrt:lcs with Stalin. lie
warned Lenin that their opponents \\ouJJ not att:!ck '.'>lraii_'.ht on. hut r;1thcr with flanking
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of t!:i; lc::cr \H1:1cn h;. Trot\ky.
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maneuvers or false attempts to improve the monopoly that would actually undercut it.
Lenin asked that Trotsky defend their position. since his health prevented him from
attending the December plenum to discuss the issue. I le sent a letter to Stalin telling him
to continue the debate without him. that Trotsky and he were in full agreement on the

issue and that he would speak for both of them. 27 It is possible that the idea of Trotsky
nnd Lenin working together made Stalin quite ;1pprchensivc, and necessitated his need for
the support of two other Politburo members, Lev Kamenev and <irigory Zinovicv. These
three would join together in a triumvirate whose purpose was to keep Trotsky out of
power.
Lenin's actions and words arc more telling to us now than they must have been to
Tmtsky at the time, in regards to the strength of their opponents and the danger of the
st.ate apparatus. Lenin was extremely apprehensi\'e regarding their chances of victory,
and asked Trotsky to announce their solidarity on this issue at the Plenum, and to fight
with all his might against the possibility that their opponents would delay the issue.
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Lenin was so fearful of their defeat that in se\'er~tl different letters he guar.inteed that they
would appeal this to the Congress and if necessary the rank and file in order to succeed.

It is interesting that a man who has had no problem exerting his will and getting his way
within the Party, a man who was the unque.,tioncd head of Rmsia. should he so
apprehensive about an issue that he had <,laked .,uch a claim on. Lenin must have felt that
on some level his opponents were gaining ~trcnt!lh. and his fc;1rs of the ;1pparatus and its
hold in the Party led him to bclic\'e that he c(luld h-c dcfc;itcd. \\"hat Lenin did not realize
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is that no one would stand up to him, but what Trotsky failed to recognize then nnd
continually thereafter was the strength of his opponents and the gravity of the stmggle.
Lenin's fears were forgotten in absolute joy when he and Trotsky won the
argument regarding the state monopoly at the December Plenum. I le sent n letter to
Trotsky, congratulating him for taking the position "without a single shot, by n simple
maneuver. " 29 lie urged that Trotsky not stop hut continue the attack ;md raise the issue at
the next session of Congress. 30 ·111is in itscl f goes to show to an even greater extent
Lenin's fears of his opponents. It had not been in Lenin's nature to continue the assault
alter victory is gained, but rather make pains to smooth over any hmised egos and move
on. lbis was a personality difference he had from Trotsky: he wa.'i willing to have an
nrgument and win without insulting his opponent. ·mis is evident in his treatment of
Kamcnev and Zinoviev after their deviation in I 9 I 7 at the revolution's most critical hour.
} le did not harp on their mistake or continue the attack, hut instead smoothed things over
;md allowed them back into the fold. But in this instance, he encouraged TroL'>ky to
continue the attack and take the issue to the Congress, which he had originally identified
as a last resort should they be defeated at the Plenum. "J11e fact that Lenin was so
surprised at the case of their victory and that he wanted to continue the attack goes a long
way to show how much he thought of his opponents. ·mey had passed the initial
resolution behind his back. and Lenin feared that the apparatus and hmc;mcracy would
make it impossible to reverse this Jcci~i(ln. Lenin
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more and more coming to the

belief that Stalin was performing badly \'.ithin the Party. He no longer shielded him from
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Trotsky. and instead joined Trotsky's side in arguments against Stalin. 'll1is de\'elopment
was heightened in the argument o\'er Georgia and the question of nationalities.
Georgia was a significant problem in the Bolshe\'ik plan to fonu the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. Georgia had been under Menshe\'ik rule during the ci\'il war
from 1918-1921. In February of 1921. the CC mllhorized the Red Anny to invade
Georgia and establish Bolshevik rule. The Politburo had acted on infonnation from
Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, and Grigory Ord1J10nikidze, military commander
of the Caucasian front, that assumed there was powerful popular support for n Bolshevik
uprising in Georgia. 31 Lenin had always supported sclf-detennination for nationalities,
and so along with the order to in\'ade Georgia, Lenin sent a letter to the I I1h army telling
them to behave with respect toward the so\'ereign institutions of Georgia. lie a.c;kcd that
they show particular attention and discretion towards the Georgian population, and that
anyone violating this order e\'en in the slightest way be prosecuted. 32 As late as Febrnary
1922 Trotsky showed his support for occupying Georgia. \\Tiling to the Politburo that the

Red Army should stay in Georgia, lest they leave it to "the mercy of impcrialism."JJ By
September of I 922, Lenin wa..c; beginning to ha\'e questions about the way Stalin and the
Red Army were acting. He sent a letter to Kamene\' and to the Politburo stating that
Stalin had a tendency to rush things. and that his resolution regarding the union of the
republics needed arnending. 34 Herc again we sec the diplom;1cy with which Lenin dealt
\\ith people. But in the same way that his diplomacy di-.appcarcd hy the end of 1922 on
the trade monopoly question. so too would it disappear with respect to Stalin and the
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nationalities' question. Perhaps Lenin's ire was heightened by Stalin's response to his
letter. It is significant in the sense that he openly disagreed with Lenin. which is quite out
of Stalin's character. He was a relative unknO\m for so long and even in the 1920s, when
debates raged about the future of Russia, he stayed in the middle, and never really took
the brunt of anyone's assaults. This was a large factor in his success, allowing his
enemies to tear each other down while he sat by and watched. But in this letter, he not
only disagreed with Lenin but showed some of the tactics that he later perfected when
urguing with someone. Stalin quoted from Lenin's letter, using his own words against
him. lie \\Tote that Lenin in fact rushed things. and he wondered if the panisans of
independence would be emboldened by Lenin's words.JS What later emerged and what
ungercd Lenin was that Stalin was not just repressing the Mensheviks but had gone so far
as to intimidate the Georgian Bolsheviks, whose leaders were P.G. Mdivani and F.Y.
Makharadzc. 36 Lenin no longer displayed any patience or diplomacy with Stalin. ·me
Georgia case, coupled with the trade monopoly issue, had raised serious doubts about
Stalin's abilities.
Lenin \\Tote "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomilation "'on 30
December 1922. ln it he expressed regret for not having stood up sooner on the issue of
Georgia. but he had believed his recovery from illness would come in time for either the
October or December plenary sessions of Congress. at \\hich point Lenin could address
the issues in person. If things had gone so far that Ord1J10nikidze had to apply physical
violence then clearly the autonomilation plan was "radically wrong and hadly timed.''n

'' Sulin. letter dated 1i Scptcrnbcr 1921. lb:d 7 ~ 3· ( ~
'' Deutscher, SO
1

~ Lenin and Trots!.·y. 133.

:!I

One must remember that this operation was undertaken on the advice of Stalin, and Lenin
c.:crtainly remembered it himself. Lenin wrote that Stalin allowed haste and infatuation
with administration, a strong insult in Lenin's view, to play a fatal role. lie said,
directing his criticism at Stalin, "in politics spite generally plays the basest of rolcs."JK
Lenin questioned Stalin's abilities in oflice, but he also questioned the apparatus that
allowed such events to happen. Ordzhonikidze was wrong for his actions, but so was
Feliks Dzerz.hinski, a member of the Central Committee who played an active role in the
Georgia affair alongside Stalin, for his casual attitude regarding the resort to violence.
Both of these men acted inexcusably, with a Russian frame of mind 39 and without
restraint. Lenin \\Tote that these actions do not come from a communist appamtus, hut
rather from Tsarism only minimally consecrated Soviet. Lenin \\Tote that this apparatus
was not our 0\\11, but a Tsarist apparatus that had been tinged with Soviet oil. I le was
fearful of an imperfect machine that was still exercising control.'' 0
In a continuation of his notes dated 31 December 1922, Lenin railed against Stalin
personally.
The Georgian (Stalin] who is neglectful of this aspect of the question, or who
carelessly flings about accusations of 'national-socialism' (whereas he himself is
a real and true 'national-socialist,' and even a vulgar Great Russian bully),
violates, in substance, the interests of proletarian class solidarity.••
Lenin was essentially accusing Stalin of bourgeois-nationalist sentiments. I le
\\Tote that Stalin did not understand the basics of the proletarian class struggle. ·me fact
that Lenin would hurl such a comment at not just a Communist. a mcmhcr of the Party. a
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lifetime revolutionary, but a member of the Politburo, goes to show how far his opinion
of Stalin had fallen. Lenin was fearful of the apparatus, but also of the people who were
benefiting from it. Lenin wanted to continue the attack on Stalin, not just on the trade
monopoly but on all fronts. Lenin must have felt that his absence from inner party affairs
had lessened his influence, and he now saw an enemy in Stalin. He found an ally in
Trotsky, who was in agreement with him on all the important issues. But what is
important is how Trotsky failed to see what Lenin must have seen in Stalin: a powerful
opponent who either as a result of the apparatus or simply the manipulator of it wielded
great influence. Lenin wrote that Ordhonikidze must be punished, but that "the political
responsibility for all this truly Great Russian nationalist campaign must, of course, be laid
on Stalin and Dzerzhinski."42
Lenin sent out two letters, dated 5 and 6 March 1923, and both labeled top secret.
The first was to Trotsky, asking him to undertake the defense of the Georgian case,
because it was under "persecution" by Stalin and Dzer1J1inski, and he "cannot rely on
their impartiality."'13 The second was to the Georgians Mdivani and T\fakhard1.c
expressing his support for their cause and his indignant feelings for Ordhonikid1.c's
rudeness and the connivance of Stalin and Dzcr1J1inski.
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ll1is letter was copied to

Trotsky, but also to Kamcncv, who undoubtedly showed it to Stalin. Stalin now knew
that Lenin was not holding anything back. and Trot.sky later claimed that Lenin wanted to
form a bloc \\ith him to clean up the bureaucracy. and his fir.st victim was to be Stalin.
Trotsky also later \\Tote that Lenin promised a homhshdl for the 12 ~ Party Congress. he
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also warned Trotsky not to trust any rotten compromise from Stalin in regards to the
Georgia question. 45
Trotsky responded to Lenin's warnings with his "Thoughts on the Party: National
Question and the Education of Party Youth." He said the nationality issue boiled down to
a struggle between proletarian Russia and the peasantry of Turkestan, Ukraine, and
Georgia. In the same respect that the world is divided by the West European proletariat
and the East peasantry, the Soviet Union must be the proving ground for the relationship
between these two forces in a communist backdrop. The issue cannot be colored with
thoughts of nationalism. 46 Trotsky argued that alienating and insulting the Georgian
peasantry through predatory or nationalist sentiments would only lead them to Menshevik
and bourgeois elements. 47 He felt that the party needed a refresher course, its youth a
beginner course, on the national question. Trotsky retured to the same theme he would
use in all arguments: the need for education so that people will know how to act in the
right communist fashion. Trotsky had no problem standing for what he believed in, and
with Lenin's support anything was possible. These were the two most prominent
members of the Party, and for this reason many have identified him as the natural heir to
Lenin's throne. But it must be remembered that Trotsky, though popular with the people,
was alone in the Politburo, where the struggle was to take place. Lenin was his only
support, and when another stroke incapacitated Lenin, Trotsky was left to himself to
defend their positions. But many have argued that Trotsky still had enough ammunition
with what Lenin had recently said to defeat his opponents, so why did he not act? In this
respect we must look at what Trotsky was doing and thinking during this time period.
45
46

Deutscher, 90.
Lenin and Trotsky, 140-41.

24

Trotsky's main focus during these years was economic planning. It is prevalent in
his discussions on any issue, be it the trade monopoly or even the nationalities. Trotsky
reiterated the notion that planning was needed to function as a government. More
specifically, Trotsky wanted to grant legislative powers to the State Planning
Commission, Gosplan, so that it was not just a body planning initiatives but also acting
on them. As early as 7 August 1921, Trotsky sent a letter to a Plenum of the CC to free
Gosplan from the bureaucracy and to grant it power to act on its plans. 48 For a long time
Lenin was not supportive of Trotsky's notions of a planned economy, for he believed that
the economy itself was not developed enough to plan effectively. 49 The two leaders
continued to disagree in April of 1922 when Lenin wrote a letter regarding the functions
of deputies in government. These deputies headed the different departments in the
government, such as the Deputy of People's Commissars or the Deputy of Agriculture.
In theory, these men should be the top decision maker within their department. Lenin
wanted these deputies to oversee and make sure that orders were executed properly in
regards to the economy, and in so doing oversee the functioning of the apparatus.
Trotsky thought that officials in government should not have deputies overseeing them,
but rather they should be properly trained to know what is right and act accordingly. He
felt that the problem was not that officials ignored and did not carry out orders, but rather
that these government administrators were so badly trained that orders were carried out
incorrectly. Trotsky criticized the haphazard decision making at the top.
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that economic disorganization was the key problem, and this was the point where
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Gosplan was most needed. Trotsky believed that so many departments were given
overlapping tasks and on top of that other departments were charged with overseeing the
different acting departments, that it created utter chaos. He felt that if all planning and
organizational activity were centralized in Gosplan, much of this chaos and
disorganization would be removed. 51 He disagreed with Lenin on the notion that
inspectors such as those in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (Rabkrin) could help
revitalize the apparatus and assure the proper planning and execution of orders. 52
Trotsky's attacks on Rabkrin were in every way an attack on Stalin, for it was Stalin who
headed Rabkrin from its beginning until he was appointed General Secretary in 1922.
Trotsky had no faith in Rabkrin's ability to produce good officials and administrators
from non-party workers and peasants. For this he felt that only proper schooling would
do. Trotsky was extreme in his criticism ofRabkrin, "We must not shut our eyes to the
fact that those who work in Rabkrin are mainly officials who have come to grief in
various other fields." 53
Trotsky was obsessed with the notion of central planning, and it was his main
focus even when arguing other points. But Trotsky's desire for a planned economy came
from a realization of the disorganization that existed fo the government. He, before
Lenin, understood that the apparatus, the machine, the bureaucracy, had bled into the
Party from the state and was threatening to bring the Party down. When Lenin came to
this realization toward the end of his life, he was willing to go to extreme measures to
stop its advance. He wanted to form a bloc with Trotsky to fight the bureaucracy and
with their early success on the trade monopoly question, he wished to carry the attack
51
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into the next Congress. On the Georgia question, the full realization of the bureaucracy
came to Lenin and the fact that Stalin was a motivating force behind it. Lenin promised a
bombshell for the 12th Congress, and one can only imagine that it in some way was
similar to his postscript to his Testament, in which he calls for the removal of Stalin from
the position of Party General Secretary (GenSec). It is clear that the prospect of the
bureaucracy overrunning the Party had frightened Lenin to no end. Yet it seems Trotsky
had these same fears for much longer. So why did he not act as decisively as Lenin?
When Stalin was appointed to the position of GenSec in 1922, Lenin had tried to
get Trotsky to accept the position of Deputy Chairman of People's Commissars,
essentially a vice-premier. In title this would make Trotsky second only to Lenin in the
government, and many have argued that this would have assured Trotsky's position as
heir to Lenin. Trotsky declined the position, believing it to be a demotion since there
were already three deputy chairmen. 54 His attacks on government help to better explain
the reasons for his refusal. While many believe that this would have given him a better
position and leverage against Stalin, it is clear that at the time Trotsky did not believe that
this position held any real power. In September of 1922, Stalin arranged passage of a
resolution in the CC, while Trotsky was absent, appointing Trotsky to the position of
vice-premier. Lenin had also asked Trotsky in private to once again accept the position
of vice-premier, and Trotsky again argued that the position was useless so long as the
abuses of the bureaucracy were tolerated in the Party's leading bodies.ss In a response to
the Politburo at the beginning of 1923, Trotsky outlined his reasons for not accepting the
position. He said that if the CC appointed him to the position he would agree, but the
53
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decision would be irrational and counter to all of his organizational and administrative
plans. The existence of the Deputy Chairman position was harmful in that it took good
people from specific posts and put them in an undefined post responsible for everything
and yet nothing. 56 Trotsky for so long argued that there needed to be more centralization,
not more departments, and to accept this position would have been a complete
contradiction for Trotsky. It did not make sense for him to accept a post that he had been
criticizing for so long. What benefit would it serve, other than to possibly further his
career? Some have argued that this was Trotsky at this best, turning down a position that
could glorify his own name because he did not feel it bettered the Party, acting as a true
Communist should. But that in many ways misses the point. Whether or not Trotsky
really did have large aspirations was not the issue. The issue was that Trotsky felt the
position was meaningless, to the point whereby his accepting it would in his mind not
help him at all, but rather act as a demotion, reducing his importance in the government.
Trotsky told Lenin that the Orgburo, Politburo, and Secretariat had been making all the
major decisions of the Party, regardless of the interested department or deputy
chairman. 57 The deputy chairmen were out of the loop, and until a reorganization of the
government was effected the position of deputy chairman was meaningless. To Stalin he
replied that appointing him the Deputy Chairman to oversee the Supreme Council of the
National Economy would only divide responsibility and introduce uncertainty and
confusion where clarity was needed.
Stalin attacked Trotsky, saying that he turned down the vice-premier position
because he wanted something bigger. The comparisons to Napoleon were inevitable.
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The communists at this time frequently compared their situation to that of the French
Revolution, not only for guidance but also for things to avoid. Trotsky, as the
charismatic head of the Red Army, stood as the natural equivalent to Napoleon. Who
would people look at as a dictator in the wings: the obscure functionary Stalin, or
Trotsky, the man with the support of the military who had played an authoritarian role in
the civil war and in dealing with the Workers' Opposition? 58 The whisper campaign was
impossible to stop, and whatever friends Trotsky did have in the upper echelon of the
Party now had reason to mistrust him. A man who had been a Bolshevik for less than
half a decade now stood as the potential successor to Lenin; this was wholly unacceptable
to many in the Politburo, and specifically Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Stalin. Trotsky took
great pains to dispel the accusations that he was angling to become dictator, perhaps in
many ways at the expense of his own political career. 59
Trotsky and Lenin forged an alliance that grew stronger over time. As Lenin
became more and more appalled by the strength of the bureaucracy, he became more and
J

more inclined to support Trotsky's views on issues such as the trade monopoly and the
Georgia question. By the end of 1922, Lenin would also come to terms with Trotsky's
ideas about state planning, and as he promised to form a bloc with Trotsky he supported
him as much as he could in such poor health. Trotsky wrote many years later that his and
Lenin's solidarity guaranteed the passage of questions in the Politburo without dispute. 60
But as Trotsky also wrote in his later, exile years, Lenin held the central lever of power as
the unofficial head of the Politburo. The second lever of power, that of implementing
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central decisions, was Stalin's as the GenSec. When Lenin fell ill, Stalin was given the
central lever of power, though it was seen as only provisional, until Lenin retumed. 61
Stalin used this time to advance his own aims, and used as much of his influence as
GenSec and support of his allies Kamenev and Zinoviev to position himself at the head of
the Soviet Union. Trotsky's observation regarding the levers of power in the Soviet
Union, given the benefit of hindsight and importantly ignoring his own role in the
struggle, is still in many ways at the heart of the issue. Trotsky, with the support of Lenin
in the Politburo, was unstoppable. When Lenin's last stroke left him completely
incapacitated, Trotsky was left only with his own words and the last words of Lenin as
his defense. He faced a group of Old Guard Bolsheviks who mistrusted him and despised
him, three of whom organized on the principle that they could not bear to see Trotsky in
charge of the country. But still people want to believe that Trotsky had many
opportunities to confound his opponents and take charge of the Party, specifically at the
12th Party Congress. He and Lenin had quite recently quieted opponents on the trade
->

monopoly and most especially on the Georgia question. Finally, Lenin's last known
writings carried a few mini bombshells in their own right, and it was these writings that
people argue should have been Trotsky's main focus at the 121h Party Congress.
Lenin's fears of the way in which the Party had developed, into a band of a few
men controlling a bureaucracy from the top, were highlighted in his recommendation to
the 12th Party Conference for the reorganization of Rabkrin. His criticism of Rabkrin is
undoubtedly a criticism of Stalin, and Lenin again does not mince words. "Rabkrin does
not enjoy at the present moment a shadow of authority. Everybody knows that a worse
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organized institution ... does not exist."62 Lenin began by recommending that Rabkrin
be reduced to about 400 members, whereas about 100 nonparty workers should be elected
to increase the Central Control Commission (CCC). Lenin wrote that the Politburo,
Orgburo, and Secretariat had gained too much power, and that the power should be
returned to the CC. He thought the CC should have meetings every two months, and,
when combined with an enlarged CCC, would represent a true supreme party
conference. 63 It is interesting that Lenin was making the same criticisms of the power
structure of the Party that Trotsky had made to him when declining the position of
Deputy Chairman. He further enforced Trotsky's emphasis on education in building the
proper state apparatus. He thought that proper schooling, combined with stricter
requirements before acceptance into Rabkrin, would help improve the overall structure. 64
Lenin's attack on the bureaucracy continued in the notes from his Testament, in
which he fully supports Trotsky's notion of giving legislative function to Gosplan. He
remarked that it seemed silly that he was once opposed to this idea, since it seemed only
natural that Gosplan, with all the expertise, should act on its own knowledge. It should
have independence and self-reliance, governed by its own officials and their
conscientiousness. Further agreeing with Trotsky's opinions, Lenin argued that these
men could come only from a proper education system, training Russians how to be good
communists and know the way to enact proper communist policies. Though Lenin does
call for a periodic check on these officials, since he believed it inevitable that they would
at some point be poisoned with bourgeois ideas, he argued that this inspection should

62

Lenin and Trotsky, 47.
Ibid., 88.
64
Ibid., 93.

63

31

come from within Gosplan, and not Rabkrin. 65 This was the last issue that Trotsky and
Lenin had disagreed on, and in some of his last writings Lenin came fully into agreement
with Trotsky. His tone in this work is slightly more favorable to Trotsky than his earlier
Testament had been, but was not nearly as harsh towards Stalin as his postscript to the
Testament, dated 4 January 1923.
Lenin's Testament, as it is now called, began as a warning to the members of the
Politburo about the stability of the Central Committee. Lenin correctly prophesized that
the danger of a split in the CC lay in the relationship between Stalin and Trotsky. Lenin
recommended an increase in the size of the CC, and the return oflegislative powers to the
CC. He was fearful that the government had gotten to a point where it was simply in the
hands of a few people, and that these people could split and cause a huge rift in the Party
and the country. Lenin wished to return the control of government to more of the Party at
large, rather than simply a few select people. Included in his Testament was an
~valuation

of the key people within the Politburo. He identified Trotsky as a man of

outstanding ability and perhaps the most capable man in the Party. But he criticized
· Trotsky for his excessive self-assurance. Many people have interpreted this statement
differently, either as a critique of his leadership abilities or a warning to Trotsky to
change his ways. The point is that Trotsky should have taken more from this sentiment
than he did. Stalin, as the GenSec, "has unlimited authority in his hands, and I am not
sure whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution."

66

We have seen the evolution of Lenin's opinion of Stalin and the machine that he had
learned to manipulate. Lenin had dropped many hints as to his true opinion of what
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should be done to Stalin, and in his postscript he says it quite bluntly. "Stalin is too rude
and this defect ... becomes intolerable in a general·secretary." He recommended the
removal of Stalin, and his replacement with someone who is "more tolerant, more loyal,
more polite, and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc." 67 This may be
simply the words of a man angry at another for insulting his wife. But it is clear that
Lenin's opinion of Stalin had deteriorated over time, and it all culminated in an incident
with Lenin's wife, in which it seems Stalin was extremely rude to her over the phone.
Whether or not this was the bombshell Lenin planned for the

12th

Congress is unsure, but

Lenin's words give ample ammunition to Trotsky for use in an argument. He even went
so far as to say that Stalin should be removed from the position of GenSec, the basis of
his power and the center around which the machine rotated.
With Lenin's strong words, the beginning of March was a bleak time for the
triumvirate ofKamenev, Zinoviev, and Stalin. The Georgian affair had been the latest
gefeat, and Lenin's warnings to Trotsky not to accept a rotten compromise from the
triumvirs seemed to spell doom. But Lenin's final stroke, the one that incapacitated him,
emboldened the triumvirs. Trotsky had a meeting with Kamenev in which he agreed to
not punish Stalin and to turn over all of Lenin's notes on the issue to the Politburo.
Trotsky agreed in an article on March 20, appearing in Pravda, that he would not upset
the status quo provided an effort for serious change occurred. Despite Lenin's warnings,
Trotsky entered into the
triumvirs. 68
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The 12th Congress was characterized by homage's to Lenin and Trotsky, and
some to Kamenev and Zinoviev, while almost none were given to Stalin. On the surface
it appeared as every other congress had since the revolution, as though nothing was
different.. But underneath the surface, the triumvirate was closing ranks. This congress
was in reality dominated by the triumvirate: Kamenev presided over it, Zinoviev
enunciated policy, and Stalin manipulated the Party machine. 69 Trotsky remained passive
throughout the entire congress, and the great irony was that when the Georgian issue was
raised, it was in fact Stalin who spoke in their defense. Trotsky said nothing, and
honored the agreement he had made with the triumvirs to remain silent and to not publish
Lenin's notes on the issue so long as serious change was enacted. 70 Most people are
astounded at this congress. How could Trotsky not stand up and defend the Georgians?
How could he not follow through with Lenin's wishes and publish his Testament, and
ultimately remove Stalin from his position of power? Some people believe that Trotsky's
position was so strong, he could have barely lifted a finger and been successful at the 12th
Congress.
This kind of thinking misses some key points in Trotsky's character. The first
was his undying devotion to the Bolshevik/Communist Party. When he joined the
Bolshevik Party after years of estrangement, he came to it after years of contemplation.
He always said in his own defense that he did not arrive at the decision to be a Bolshevik
haphazardly, but after years of consideration. What this meant was that his devotion was
that much stronger, when he joined he joined fully and without regret. Trotsky had
supported the notion of Party solidarity from the 10th Congress, and was not one to go
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back on his word. Trotsky defended the Communist Party in Russia until almost the end
of his life. In many speeches around the world, he remained convinced that the
bureaucracy of Stalinism was only a cancer, and though a potentially deadly one, it was a
problem that could still be fixed. Despite the failings of Stalinism, Trotsky continued to
defend the Soviet Union. He argued that even though it was flawed it was still the only
country that featured a dictatorship of the proletariat. At the very least it put the interests
of the proletariat above all others. 71 This sort of devotion, to a party which had exiled
him and sent him away as an outcast, with a leader who would rather have him dead, says
a good deal about Trotsky's silence. He did not need to attack his fellow Party members
in the Politburo, for whatever he thought of their intelligence they were all still ultimately
Communists and would do what was right. Everyone in the Politburo was telling him
that the notes on the Georgian issue and Lenin's Testament should not be published.
Trotsky had agreed to not push the arguments, so who was he to break such an
agreement?
Trotsky's devotion to the Party is further evidenced by a speech he gave to the
13th Party Congress, at which point he was being vilified for his "Left Opposition," and
under persecution for writings such as "The New Course," and "Lessons of October."
These writings had come after the

12th

Congress, and were in many ways what people felt

Trotsky should have been doing all along. The "New Course" harped on his ideas of
organization in the economy, but also called for the younger generation to take a more
active role in the affairs of the Party. Trotsky was criticized for trying to manipulate the
younger generation against the Old Guard. "Lessons of October" was an introduction to
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one of Trotsky's books in which he looks back at the Russian Revolution, glorifying his
own role and reminding people of Zinoviev and Kamenev' s dissension from Lenin at this
time. He was again criticized for giving an unclear account of the events, and for
bringing up events from the past that were now irrelevant. In the midst of all this
uncertainty, Trotsky delivered a vote of confidence to the Communist Party.
"None of us wants to be or can be right against the party. In the last analysis, the party is
always right, because the party is the sole historical instrument that the working class
possesses for the solution of its fundamental tasks." 72
Trotsky's devotion to the Party is almost sad in its defeatist nature. But more of
that speech gives a better idea of what Trotsky was thinking. "The Party could not make
any decision, no matter how incorrect and unjustified, that could shake by even one iota
out total devotion to the cause of the Party, and the readiness to shoulder the
responsibility of party discipline under all circumstances." 73 To many people these
_famous words from Trotsky's speech in 1924 have taken on a romantic quality. Here was
a man ready to sacrifice himself, to do what the Party told him against perhaps his better
judgement, because he was certain in the overall rightness of its cause. In some sense it
is as though his sacrifice was the means to a greater end. But the problem with this
argument is that Trotsky had shown a willingness to say what he believed to be right
before. In late 1922, he spoke out on the issues of economic planning and the Georgia
case, only then with the support of Lenin. He would do so again after the Twelfth
Congress, when his position in the Party was much less secure and his words did not
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carry with them the weight they once did. Yet in 1923, with essentially the same
arguments raging, he is willing to submit to the will of the Party, even if it is wrong,
simply for some notion of the defense of the proletariat. This idea of his devotion and
solidarity to the Party is not wrong, but it has been exaggerated and romanticized too far.
A simple devotion to the Communist cause does not fully explain why Trotsky did almost
nothing at the 121h Congress, as all his opponents maneuvered against him and ignored
the wishes of Lenin. Trotsky's devotion to the Party had never meant willing submission,
it meant arguing for what he thought was best for the future of the Party. The two more
significant influences preventing him from action were the idea that it was not his place
to cause a stir in the Party, and also that he saw no need for him to attack his opponents.
Since Lenin was the one who had initiated the struggle against the bureaucracy
and in some ways against Stalin, Trotsky thought it was his battle to be fought. Further
complicating the situation was the problem of Lenin's health: his last stroke had not
killed him but had left him completely incapacitated. Despite this condition, doctors for a
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long time thought that he had a chance for recovery. Trotsky held Lenin in very high
esteem. Though Trotsky did not seem to keep many close friends, Lenin was at the very
least his mentor and also his peer. Whenever Trotsky references Lenin and his writings,
it is always with a great amount of respect and awe, and in some ways almost affection.
Trotsky had worked closely with Lenin for a long time, and though a very arrogant man
with regard to ideas, he held Lenin in the highest esteem. Trotsky did not want to take up
Lenin's fight and have people think that he was aiming for Lenin's mantle. He was
already struggling with rumors about his potential Bonapartism, and he did not want to
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fuel these rumors by taking Lenin's fight "when Lenin was struggling with death." 74
That to him seemed cold and calculating, and ultimately he believed that it was not his
battle to be fought.
At the 12th Congress, Trotsky focused only on economics, and specifically on
economic planning. To Trotsky, economic planning was his most important issue, he had
talked about it when discussing the trade monopoly, and in some ways when talking
about the nationalities question. Economic planning meant more to Trotsky then it did
for anyone else. It also involved issues such as the reorganization of the government and
the rebuilding of a proper Party apparatus. To Trotsky, the failings of economic planning
were the failings of the party apparatus and the Stalin-led bureaucracy that was
controlling it. Trotsky's plans for reorganizing the economic planning were symptomatic
of his greater plans to ultimately reorganize the government into a more effective and
functioning body. Trotsky recognized the Party's responsibility in the creation of the
bureaucracy. "This machine ... did not drop onto our shoulders, but was created by us
under the pressure of historical necessity." But Trotsky looked to the 12th Congress as a
chance to change the way government was run. "Who is responsible? We all are, and we
shall answer for it." 75 Trotsky's arguments for economic planning were not an example
of him giving up, it was simply what he thought was most important at that time. When
he discussed economic planning it did not signify that he did not care about what was
going on with inner Party affairs. Trotsky had for so long identified Gosplan as the most
important issue facing the Russian government. It only makes sense that this is what he
talked about, this is to him what the future of Russia depended on.
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Trotsky's arrogance also may have contributed to his lack of political
maneuvering and foresight. Trotsky must have felt on some level that any opponents
were still too fearful to make a move for power in the wake of Lenin's harsh words.
Ultimately this opinion stemmed from an underestimation of his opponents in the
struggle and also the type of struggle that he was involved in. Though Trotsky had had
disagreements with Stalin in the past, he failed to recognize him as a true adversary,
worthy of his time. Trotsky, like everyone else, looked mostly to Zinoviev out of the
three triumvirs as his most dangerous opponent. This underestimation of Stalin as an
adversary was coupled with his failure to understand the importance and nature of the
struggle. While the triumvirate was for the most part angling quite simply for political
position, Trotsky was arguing on the plain of ideas.
Trotsky viewed this highly political battle as simply an argument of ideas, and
this highlights not only his lack of political savvy, but also his underestimation of his
opponents in this struggle. Not only did he fail to recognize the gravity of the struggle he
was in, but he also identified his main adversaries as Kamenev and Zinoviev, not Stalin.
The fact that Stalin was organizationally master of the Party by 1923 was lost on Trotsky,
though a dying Lenin had become increasingly aware of this phenomenon. Trotsky was
not alone in his underestimation of Stalin, as even those who aligned with the GenSec
misjudged him, but took sides with him out of a fear of Trotsky as leader. 76 In that
faction, most would agree that at the time, Zinoviev was the most prominent Bolshevik
behind Lenin and Trotsky. 77 Trotsky made this same mistake, and as he argued on a
plain of ideas, he focused his attacks on the theories ofKamenev and Zinoviev. The
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faction continued to maneuver politically against Trotsky, as they knew they had to first
distance Trotsky from Lenin, and then try to show the weaknesses in his arguments. A
second Politburo was formed, comprised of all the Politburo members except for Trotsky
and of course the ailing Lenin, which began to formulate policy in Trotsky's absence. 78
The existence of such a body reinforces the idea that Trotsky was truly isolated in the
Party, and that as this political battle took shape, Trotsky's position was not strong at all.
He had no allies in the Politburo, and failed to identify Stalin as a threat.
Trotsky's opinion of Stalin remained poor until his death. He wrote in exile, that
Stalin is "the most outstanding mediocrity in our party." 79 Trotsky refused to
acknowledge even after his loss in the struggle with Stalin, that the man held any positive
attributes, even in politics. He wrote that those who attribute Stalin's success to his
"personal forcefulness ... or at least to his exceptional cunning," are no more than "idle
fools and observers." 80 Trotsky instead identified Stalin's rise to power as stemming
"from causes lying deep in the dynamics of historical forces." 81 This explanation is
probably comforting for Trotsky, since it identified his own fate as simply a victim of
historical forces, but it also goes to show how little he thought of Stalin. Trotsky refused
to give any credit to Stalin for his success in the political battle, instead writing that he
benefited from the same forces that relegated Trotsky to exile. To Trotsky, Stalin was
neither a thinker, a writer, nor an orator. Trotsky felt no need to acknowledge Stalin as
an adversary, because he was nothing more than a Georgian peasant, a mediocrity. Stalin
took power not with personal qualities but with the aid of an impersonal machine that had
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grown in the Soviet Union.

82

Much of Trotsky's biography of Stalin, left unfinished in

1940 with his death, is simply criticisms aimed at Stalin, and show how little he
continued to think of Stalin as a person. Trotsky felt no need to break his silence on the
nationalities issue or the foreign trade monopoly, because Stalin would not dare go
against Lenin's words. Trotsky believed that a man of so little capabilities could not be a
threat, certainly not against Lenin and Trotsky, the two most prominent communists. His
underestimation of Stalin, though in many ways understandable and quite common at the
time, aided his relative inactivity on many of the important issues in the Soviet Union and
gave Stalin enough time to consolidate his power and his control of the bureaucracy
within the Party.
By the time Trotsky broke his silence, in October 1923, all the cards were stacked
against him. Stalin had control of the machine, as he really had had for a couple of years
and as Lenin had realized on his deathbed. But the 12th Party Congress was a last chance
.of sorts for Trotsky to bring down that wall, throw the curtain up and reveal the wizard
pulling the strings for what he really was. Trotsky was an intelligent man but one cannot
totally fault him for missing the struggle that was happening under his nose and an enemy
in the form of Stalin. There is no question that Trotsky's arrogance had left him
vulnerable, and that he underestimated until his death the abilities of a man who had
manipulated so many of the Bolshevik elite. But can Trotsky really be blamed for that?
Stalin's own allies, Kamenev and Zinoviev, underestimated his abilities and also the
strength of the bureaucracy that he controlled. They did not fully come to realize his
strength until their own efforts against him in 1926 fizzled before they really even started.
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Trotsky's arguments for the future of Russia in such works as "The New Course" and his
speeches on economic planning are interesting in some ways for their Marxist
philosophy, but in no way should be considered as a real part of the struggle of the Left
Opposition. Those works were written in the hope of an appeal to the common people,
the rank and file who could turn the tide in Trotsky's favor, as they had in 1917 with the
revolution. Trotsky had already lost the battle within the Party, as Stalin's machine
appointed his own supporters through and through. The "Lenin levy," in which the Party
admitted hordes of new members at Stalin's behest to honor Lenin's death, brought in
200,000 uneducated workers who were lost in Trotsky's confused discussions of the
oppression of classes and other complicated arguments regarding Marxist theory. These
people identified easily with Stalin's simple ideas of socialism in one country, in that
they were tinged with an optimism for the future and a good bit of nationalist pride.
Trotsky was painted as a pessimist, who had no faith in the ability of the Russian worker,
but instead felt the need for help from Western Europe in order to survive.
Trotsky's struggle, late in its beginnings, failed to recognize the social vacuum
that he lived in. The disintegration of the working class from the time of the revolution,
because of war, famine, and hardship, made it even less of a political factor in the 1920s
than it had been in the revolution. The passivity of the masses corresponded to an
increase in the autonomy of the party apparatus, with Stalin at the helm. The struggle
was confined to the upper reaches of the Party, where Trotsky had no friends. His effort
to take the struggle to the masses was based on a belief in the revolutionary, fighting
potential of the proletariat. But whatever speeches and rallies not stopped by the Party,
were met with a general lack of care from the masses.
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The romanticism surrounding Trotsky is not unjust. For as much as communism
has been criticized, Trotsky was an intelligent man who came to the conclusion that
Marxism was the best way to better the lives of the oppressed peoples of the world.
Whatever harsh measures he had taken during his career did serve some better purpose,
and Trotsky constantly had to fight the contradiction of his beliefs between the necessity
for harsh controls but also his compassion and belief in freedom of thought and
expression. Trotsky was a brilliant man, but it was a brilliance suited for revolution, not
for day to day administration and the backstage politics that went on in the time of
excessive bureaucracy. His brilliance was in theories, and in giving speeches, not in
maneuvering for power and jockeying for allies. If Trotsky did not think much of you, he
would not try to win you over for the purpose of an ally. When Kamenev and Zinoviev
became his allies in 1926, it was because they came to him, and admitted their wrongs, he
had not gone to them. Trotsky's arrogance had further ruined his chances. He assumed
_,too little from his opponents, and he assumed that Lenin's words would be enough even
if the man was not there to support them. Trotsky did not figure that anyone could
challenge him in a theoretical debate, but he failed to realize that this was not a
theoretical debate. This was a political battle, one in which Trotsky's talents were
inappropriate and ineffective.
Finally, one must question whether or not Trotsky ever wanted to be the head of
the Soviet Union. There is no denying that Trotsky wanted all of his ideas to be set into
action, but does that mean that he wanted to be the head of the government. In many
ways that may be a mantle that historians have placed on him in wondering how different
things would be if Trotsky had taken control and not Stalin. For a man who believed
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strongly in Marxist theories, in the dictatorship of the proletariat, why would he become
an individual dictator unless he felt it bettered the Marxist cause? Trotsky could still
exert great influence in the Party without being its unspoken leader. This lack of desire
to take control of the Party is evidenced by his failure to even truly recognize a power
struggle. While Trotsky was arguing ideas regarding the future of the Soviet Union, his
enemies were aligning against him. They understood what Lenin's illness and eventual
death would mean, that there would be a vacuum at the top of the Party that someone
would have to fill. For Trotsky, Lenin's death would show the organizational weakness
of the Party and would endanger the entire revolution because it had lost its best leader.

If there was to be another unquestioned leader, perhaps Trotsky assumed people would
ask him to do it, probably not Kamenev and Zinoviev and certainly not the Georgian
Stalin. Trotsky's arrogance and lack of political foresight, but also to his credit a sincere
devotion to important Party affairs, made him miss !he opportunity to seize control of the
Party and the country from Stalin. Though the window of opportunity was small, it was
real, and Trotsky's lack of political savvy and maneuvering has left historians wondering
what would have been if he had taken control.
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